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Abstract
Background: The Framework Convention of Tobacco Control (FCTC) provides a basis for nation states to limit the political
effects of tobacco industry philanthropy, yet progress in this area is limited. This paper aims to integrate the findings of
previous studies on tobacco industry philanthropy with a new analysis of British American Tobacco’s (BAT) record of
charitable giving to develop a general model of corporate political philanthropy that can be used to facilitate
implementation of the FCTC.
Method: Analysis of previously confidential industry documents, BAT social and stakeholder dialogue reports, and existing
tobacco industry document studies on philanthropy.
Results: The analysis identified six broad ways in which tobacco companies have used philanthropy politically: developing
constituencies to build support for policy positions and generate third party advocacy; weakening opposing political
constituencies; facilitating access and building relationships with policymakers; creating direct leverage with policymakers
by providing financial subsidies to specific projects; enhancing the donor’s status as a source of credible information; and
shaping the tobacco control agenda by shifting thinking on the importance of regulating the market environment for
tobacco and the relative risks of smoking for population health. Contemporary BAT social and stakeholder reports contain
numerous examples of charitable donations that are likely to be designed to shape the tobacco control agenda, secure
access and build constituencies.
Conclusions and Recommendations: Tobacco companies’ political use of charitable donations underlines the need for
tobacco industry philanthropy to be restricted via full implementation of Articles 5.3 and 13 of the FCTC. The model of
tobacco industry philanthropy developed in this study can be used by public health advocates to press for implementation
of the FCTC and provides a basis for analysing the political effects of charitable giving in other industry sectors which have
an impact on public health such as alcohol and food.
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Introduction
The once confidential nature of industry documents makes
them a particularly valuable source of data for analysing the
thinking behind company policies on charitable contribu-
tions.[1,2] Partly because of this, tobacco document research has
significantly deepened understanding of the range of ways in
which corporations use charitable donations to influence poli-
cy.[3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16] This research suggests that
tobacco companies primarily allocate charitable contributions on
the basis of their potential to produce five proximate political
effects: access to policymakers; constituency building amongst civil
society organisations to build support for policy positions and
generate third party advocacy;[17,18,19] constituency fragmenta-
tion[20] in which donations are used to weaken opposing
constituencies; enhancement of the donor’s status as a source of
credible information, and framing/agenda setting (see
Table 1).[13,14,15,16]
This work has been instrumental in facilitating efforts to restrict
the tobacco industry’s ability to benefit politically from its
charitable donations via Articles 5.3 and 13 of the World Health
Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC), the World Health Organization’s (WHO) first global
public health treaty (Appendix S1). Nevertheless, existing studies
have primarily focused on the US multinational Philip Morris
(PM) and may provide an incomplete account of the political
versatility of corporate philanthropy. The present study therefore
aims to develop the existing literature in three respects. First, it
aims to explore the extent to which existing research on tobacco
industry philanthropy can be generalised by using industry
documents to examine the political aims underlying British
American Tobacco’s (BAT) charitable contributions. Second, it
aims to develop an integrated model of corporate political
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philanthropy that combines the results of the present documentary
analysis with documentary findings of the existing literature.
Third, it aims to examine the political aims behind contemporary
examples of BAT charitable donations reported in the company’s
recent social and stakeholder dialogue reports and thereby
evaluate the contemporary relevance of the model. In doing so,
the paper aims to inform the implementation of Articles 5.3 and
13 of the FCTC by providing an in depth, synthesised analysis of
the political aims underlying tobacco industry philanthropy.
Methodology
The present study emerged from a larger programme of work
that aimed to explore the rationale, extent and impact of BAT’s
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. BAT is head-
quartered in the UK and is the third largest tobacco company by
revenue, after Philip Morris International and the Imperial
Tobacco Group.[21,22] It represents itself as the most interna-
tional tobacco company on the basis of its large number of
subsidiaries in low and middle income countries and has a strong
track record of providing money and gifts in kind to a wide variety
of organisations.[23,24,25,26]
Documents were identified via online searches of the Legacy
Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) be-
tween June 2009 and May 2011. For the current study 459
documents were studied in detail and indexed using Endnote.
Analysis of the documents was based on a qualitative, hermeneutic
methodology [27] with documents coded according to an
inductively developed framework drawing on concepts used to
describe corporate political activity and policy influence in the
social sciences such as access, direct lobbying, constituency
building, third party lobbying, policy subsidies, and agenda
setting.[20,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40] In addition,
the documents were organised chronologically to draw out
changes in the thinking underlying BAT’s charitable contributions
over time.
The political aims underlying BAT’s contemporary record of
charitable giving were examined using BAT’s social, sustainability
(hereafter referred to as social reports), and stakeholder dialogue
reports. As of 12th December 2012, BAT’s Reporting Download
Centre (http://www.bat.com/group/sites/uk__3mnfen.nsf/
vwPagesWebLive/DO6RZGHL?opendocument&SKN=1) pro-
vided links to 12 group social reports, 6 group stakeholder
dialogue reports, 7 subsidiary stakeholder reports, and 34
subsidiary social reports (published between 2002 and 2012). We
downloaded 12 English language stakeholder dialogue and social
reports produced by BAT subsidiaries covering the World Bank’s
four main country classifications (low income, lower middle
income, upper middle income, high income). Selected reports
were downloaded on 12th December 2012 and searched using key
terms such as charit,, community, donat,, social invest,, and
philan,. Examples of charitable giving subsequently identified
were then coded using the same concepts employed to categorise
the documentary findings. The web-sites of charitable foundations
referred to in the reports selected were also reviewed and coded
using the same concepts.
Results
The Evolution of Strategic Philanthropy within BAT
BAT documents from the late 1970s and early 1980s suggest
that although BAT internal guidelines on charitable giving aimed
to tie charitable donations to the firm’s broader commercial
objectives,[41,42,43,44] in practice, the broad construction of
these policies meant that contributions were relatively unfo-
cused[41,42,43] and donations were allocated to a wide range of
causes and groups.[43,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52] By the early
1990s concerns over increasing efforts by national governments
to introduce public smoking restrictions combined with general
disquiet over the anti-globalisation movement encouraged BAT
staff to take a more methodical approach to managing the
company’s image and reputation[53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61] (we
use reputation for both concepts to denote what third parties think
of BAT).[53,62,63,64,65,66] During the early 1990s the first
evidence emerges of BAT staff emphasising the potential political
value of philanthropy. Documents tie donations to the enhance-
ment of the company’s reputation, which was regarded as key to
maintaining the company’s political influence in existing markets
and establishing it in countries which BAT was expanding into
following trade reforms and privatisation of formerly state owned
tobacco manufacturers.[54,55,56,61,63,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74]
More specifically, a positive reputation was linked to a number
of discrete political objectives via a range of intermediate effects.
These intermediate effects included increasing social actors’
acceptance of company messages, placating social actors who
might otherwise oppose the company, supporting constructive
relationships with governments, and building support amongst
local and national communities,[54,55,56,58,60,61,68,69,71,
75,76,77,78,79,80,81] whilst objectives encompassed changes in
excise systems, the successful defence of product liability litigation,
general regulatory management, and the facilitation of joint
ventures and market entry.[58,59,70,79,82,83,84,85]
A review conducted in the late 1990s by consultant Julian
Oliver, who had worked with Shell on its CSR programme,
suggests that BAT was slow to harness the political potential of
charitable contributions.[86] Oliver concluded that the company’s
contributions were largely reactive and disjointed and, therefore,
generated ‘‘little brand or corporate reputational re-
turns’’.[45,46,47,48,49,87,88] He advocated a more ‘‘integrated’’
and ‘‘strategic’’ approach organised around a small number of
common themes.[87] By tailoring these themes to local demands,
Oliver argued that BAT could convey a ‘‘common message to
public policy makers, international NGOs and the media’’ that the
company understood its communities and customers better than
other social actors.[87] The key, Oliver claimed, was to identify
and support projects that had ‘‘a high political priority’’ which
would ‘‘enhance BAT’s ability to build ‘platforms for dialogue’
with rule-makers’’ and ‘‘deliver tangible benefits in terms of
improved access, influence and international recognition/reputa-
tion’’.[87]
The trigger for Oliver’s report seems to have been concern over
the company’s declining political influence.[89,90,91,92,93,94,95]
BAT attributed this to failings in its existing political strategy,
which it regarded as reactive and confrontational.[90,95] Its
managers, therefore, advocated a different approach that centred
on repackaging its ‘‘philanthropic activities’’ to actively change
negative perceptions of the company.[95] The evidence suggests
BAT accepted Oliver’s analysis of the political underperformance
of the firm’s philanthropy and introduced concrete changes
reflecting its managers’ faith in the politically restorative powers of
strategic giving.[94,96,97,98] At around the same time Oliver
presented his report to the company, BAT began to make large,
conspicuous donations to education institutions, health organisa-
tions and NGOs.[16,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107] More
recent evidence suggests that large donations around specific
themes continue to characterise BAT’s strategy for allocating
charitable contributions (see, for example, Appendix
S2).[108,109,110,111,112]
Corporate Philanthropy and Health Policy
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Political Aims of BAT’s Charitable Donations
Constituency Building. The capacity of donations to
‘‘develop potential allies’’ has been a major theme within BAT’s
charitable giving with contributions being made to build
constituencies with a wide range of groups, including: communities
local to company plants, constituencies that make up parts of the
tobacco supply chain (such as leaf growing communities), and civil
society organisations (see Appendices S2 and S3).[98,113]
Donations have been considered key to building constituencies
partly by facilitating closer relationships and, thereby, greater trust
with recipients[113] and partly by encouraging recipient organi-
sations, their beneficiaries and other constituencies that benefit
indirectly from contributions (such as local communities) to
identify their interests with those of BAT.[90,113]
Documents suggest that building constituencies to expand
opportunities for third party lobbying has been closely linked to
concerns about the company’s declining credibility as a source of
policy relevant information.[86,113] Thus, BAT supported the
Beijing Liver Foundation (renamed the Beijing Health Promotion
Society in 1999 – see below) to lobby the Ministry of Public Health
to ‘‘maintain a perspective on health issues’’, recognising that the
company could not ‘‘credibly, directly communicate with the
Ministry.’’[114,115] Donations capable of sustaining partnerships
have been particularly valued within BAT for their capacity to
facilitate third party lobbying, reflecting a conviction in the
effectiveness of long term relationships to foster trust both with
partnering organisations and other NGOs and public officials
within the partners’ networks.[81,113]
Access and Relationship Building. BAT documents high-
light the perceived value of philanthropy in securing access to
public and elected officials by generating political capital and
goodwill amongst policy e´lites, creating opportunities to meet with
them, and fostering trust amongst other social actors, such as
NGOs and opinion formers (see Appendices 2 and
3).[58,80,113,116] In addition, there are examples of BAT
specifically allocating money to form partnerships with NGOs in
the hope of exploiting their links with policymakers and
contributing to programmes with a view to entering into direct
partnership with government ministries(Appendix S2).[117]
There is also evidence of an intention to earmark donations for
specific causes, which overlap with government policies, precisely
because of their potential to facilitate access to policy-
makers.[86,113] One document reported that the ‘‘essence’’ of
targeting charitable contributions was to ‘‘identify and support
projects that have high political priority and that would enhance
BAT’s ability to build ‘platforms for dialogue’ with rule-makers in
several countries.’’[87,98] For example, BAT’s decision to fund
urban regeneration projects and City Technology Colleges in the
UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was rationalised on their
‘‘proximity and access to the UK government’’.[94]
Financial support for scholarships aimed at creating supportive
political constituencies demonstrates the long term and sophisti-
cated nature of the use of philanthropy to optimise access. One
report from the late 1990s, for example, highlighted the
importance of providing finance for overseas postgraduate
students as part of a ‘‘long-term investment in potential leaders
in developing markets’’,[94] whilst another (dated 1999) explained
that funding scholarships in tertiary education would create
‘‘alumni that will in future be part of the national leadership of the
world in which we do business.’’[118]
Framing Effects and Agenda Setting. Documents highlight
several ways in which donations are used to shape how the
company is perceived (reputational framing effects). For example,
an early communication plan for the Tobacco Advisory Council
(TAC) (of which BAT was a member) refers to using ‘‘philan-
thropic work as a means of demonstrating industry concern for
social well-being, and of offsetting negative effects accruing to the
industry from the primary health and passive smoking is-
sues’’.[119] Existing research suggests that mitigating negative
assessments of the firm has the potential to shape the tobacco
control agenda by changing how policymakers and civil society
organisations assess its aggregate social impacts.
[5,13,30,120,121,122,123,124,125,126]
BAT’s documents also indicate that the company has consis-
tently linked contributions to the ‘‘needs and aspirations of
national communities which are relevant to local development
needs’’.[59,68,69,94,113,127,128] Existing studies on the political
effects of displacement frames (which work to change perceptions
by providing alternative ways of appraising issues, rather than
directly challenging the facts that underlie them) suggest that
donations which consistently produce this association have the
potential to shape the tobacco control agenda by shifting the
primary basis upon which the firm should be judged: away from
health towards its perceived economic impacts on inward
investment, employment, and foreign earn-
ings.[5,13,30,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,129]
The documents indicate that BAT has tried to produce a similar
effect by associating the firm with NGOs involved in development
(see Appendix S2).[130] A 2000 presentation by Andreas
Vecchiet, then BAT’s International Political Affairs Manager,
highlighted the importance of partnerships to promoting ‘‘the
proposition that the answers to major concerns arising from
perceived market and governmental failure can be reached via
bona fide and mutually beneficial partnerships between govern-
ments, companies and the ‘civil society’’’.[131] The slides explain
that the ‘‘subtext’’ to such partnerships was that ‘‘profits from legal
products…are a precursor of and underpin political, social,
economic and environmental development’’.[131]
In addition, the documents indicate a close connection between
constituency building and agenda setting with donations allocated
to some groups on the basis of their potential to shape policy
agenda though their influence on government thinking and news
reporting.[16,99,131,132,133,134,135,136,137] Furthermore, do-
nations have been made to shift thinking on the importance of
tobacco control regulation by influencing perceptions of the
relative risks of tobacco to population level health. The approach
was originally part of BAT’s efforts to limit the spread of smoking
restrictions and involved the company highlighting specific (non-
tobacco related) health concerns to focus attention on ‘‘real
community health concerns.’’[138,139] BAT China’s financial
support for the Beijing Liver Foundation indicates how the
strategy has informed decisions on charitable giving. Founded in
1997 by the Soong Ching Ling Foundation (now the China Soon
Ling Foundation),[140,141] a high profile and well-connected
Chinese charity which BAT considered to be a key anti-smoking
group in China,[128] BAT’s support for the Beijing Liver
Foundation was designed to raise the profile of hepatitis which it
considered ‘‘should be of greater significance to the [People’s
Republic of China] and the WHO’’ than smoking.[142] Accord-
ing to one document, the ultimate aim of the donation was to
‘‘reprioritise the agenda’’ of both the Soong Ching Ling
Foundation and the Ministry of Public Health and ‘‘divert the
public attention from smoking and health issues to liver
diseases’’.[115,140,143]
Finally, documents also suggest donations are used to neutralise
the agenda setting potential of civil society organisations calling for
regulation to address the socially harmful consequences of
corporate activity. BAT’s donation to the Earthwatch Institute
Corporate Philanthropy and Health Policy
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e80864
(Europe) in the early 1990s, for example, seems to have been
partly motivated by a desire to defuse calls for more rigorous,
formal, regulation of corporate environmental harm in the lead up
to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (the Rio Summit) (Appendix S2).
Subsidies and Direct Political Leverage. A 1994 letter
from Raymond Acorda, Managing Director of the Bangladesh
Tobacco Company, to the chair of Bangladesh’s National Board
of Revenue illustrates that BAT has used contributions in low
income countries as a bargaining chip in its efforts to change
policy. In the letter Acorda indicated that a failure to reverse an
increase in the tobacco excise rate might lead to a withdrawal of
charitable donations and sponsorships.
‘‘If these two brands continue to be adversely affected we
will be unable to continue to cover our Production,
Administrative and Selling overheads - furthermore the
cash will not be available in order to invest in the cigarette
business; in some of the diversification projects (e.g.
Sunflower oil) which we have been experimenting with;
and much of the social and voluntary work that BTC
[Bangladesh Tobacco Company] supports (e.g. afforesta-
tion, charitable donations, sponsorships etc.).’’ [144]
This illustrates the potential for charitable donations to be used
as financial subsidies that create direct political leverage. A
discussion amongst BAT managers over how to replicate the
perceived political benefits of a donation by R.J. Reynolds to
repair the Haizhu Bridge in Guangzhou province, China, in the
early 1990s, suggests one way in which donations might produce
this effect is by creating a sense of indebtedness amongst political
e´lites.[143] BAT managers noted that the donation constituted the
‘‘sort of gesture to which officialdom will feel obligated’’.[143]
Enhancement of Company Status as a Source of Credible
Information. BAT documents indirectly link charitable dona-
tions to enhancing the company’s status as a source of credible
information through their positive effect on corporate reputa-
tion.[58,78] Our documentary searches failed to locate specific
examples of donations being made to produce this effect, and the
potential for philanthropy to increase the company’s credibility as
a purveyor of information may, therefore, have represented a
general underlying justification of and guide for donations within
the company.
Evidence of Political Philanthropy in BAT’s Contemporary
Charitable Giving
The review of selected social and stakeholder dialogue reports
indicates that donations are still being used to produce a similar
range of political effects (see Table 1). In reports produced by
subsidiaries in low and middle income countries, philanthropy is
used extensively to link the company to social and economic
development (see Table 1). In some reports the association is
implied by the nature of the donation and context in which it is
made. This is illustrated by BAT Bangladesh’s coverage of its
provision of information technology education to the rural poor.
The account emphasises the world class environment and standard
of the education, which actively seeks to help young people to
accomplish things ‘‘they never dreamt of’’, and highlights the large
number of students who have obtained work as a result.[145]
Likewise, the Pakistan Tobacco Company highlights the value of
its mobile doctors in providing free health care ‘‘where there are
little or no medical facilities’’[146] and the role of its free Learning
Resource Centres which ‘‘contribute towards the development of
skilling resource in the country.’’[146]
Other company reports are more explicit about the role of their
donations in facilitating development. BAT’s South African
Sustainability Report for 2008, for example, notes that its
contributions are designed to ‘‘improve the economic, social and
environmental sustainability of previously disadvantaged individ-
uals and communities’’ (see also below).[111] BAT Nigeria, which
channels its philanthropy through the BATN Foundation, extends
this theme by illustrating how different aspects of its philanthropy
support the Nigerian Government’s drive to achieve the Millen-
nium Development Goals, such as the eradication of extreme
poverty and hunger and environmental sustainability.[147] The
subtext of this narrative - the rejection of the idea that the tobacco
industry encumbers social and economic development - is made
explicit in the company’s claim that it is leading ‘‘a collective
private sector approach to sustainable social development’’ which
will minimise poverty and empower Nigerians to ‘‘own and
control their economic destiny.’’[147] In high income countries,
donations to social and economic projects are commonly aimed at
ameliorating the social dislocation caused by deindustrialisation
(focusing, for example, on training, economic regeneration, and
the alleviation of poverty and social exclusion).[148,149,150]
There is also evidence of BAT using donations to highlight non
tobacco risks to public health in line with previous attempts to
reorder policymakers’ sense of public health priorities. The
evidence is particularly strong in the case of South Africa where
BAT focuses its donations on alleviating HIV/Aids in the
country’s disadvantaged communities through the BAT South
Africa Signature Trust.[151,152,153,154] In addition, the com-
pany’s Significant Endemic Disease Programme which aims to
reduce the impact of malaria, tuberculosis, AIDS, hepatitis and
significant bowel infection amongst the company’s employees,
their families and communities operated in 21 countries
(Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Eritrea, Greece, Indonesia,
Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Russia, Samoa, South Africa, Taiwan, Uganda, UK, Ukraine,
Vietnam and Zimbabwe, with a major focus on HIV/AIDS
in Africa, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific) in
2010.[155,156,157,158]
BAT subsidiaries’ widespread practice of making contributions
to improve water quality (through, for example, water filtration
plants in Pakistan and drilling bore holes in Uganda and Nigeria)
may have the same effect.[147,159,160,161,162] Pakistan Tobac-
co Company’s investment in water filtration plants, for example, is
part of a broader programme aimed at increasing awareness of the
benefits of clean drinking water and takes effect against a backdrop
of high levels of mortality resulting from poor quality drinking
water.[163,164,165,166] In the absence of contemporary industry
documentary evidence, the motivation behind these initiatives is
difficult to discern. At the very least, however, they are likely to
send mixed messages about the role of the tobacco industry in
mortality in low and middle income countries.
BATN Foundation’s practice of aligning charitable donations
with the Nigerian government’s objectives of achieving the
Millennium Development Goals by 2015 echo donations made
in the 1990s aimed at synchronising donations with government
priorities in order to secure access to policy e´lites.[147] Similarly,
donations made available to projects in areas local to manufac-
turing plants and to tobacco farmers are consistent with donations
made in the 1990s aimed specifically at building constituencies.
These are common and have included medical assistance (Sri
Lanka) and community water projects in regions associated with
tobacco farming (Sri Lanka and East Africa) and support for social
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and recreational projects in areas close to manufacturing plants
and area offices (Canada, Mexico, and New Zea-
land).[148,150,167,168,169]
Although using donations aimed at building constituencies can
indirectly weaken opposing political constituencies by limiting the
pool of willing allies, there were no clear examples of donations
being used to reduce the strength of opposing political constitu-
encies (constituency fragmentation) or generate direct political
leverage. Evidence of this is rarely publicly available and is unlikely
to be published in social and stakeholder dialogue reports. This is
consistent with BAT guidance on charitable donations from the
1990s which emphasised the importance of ensuring that the
political drivers of donations did not become public knowl-
edge.[71]
Discussion and Conclusions
The study identifies several ways in which philanthropy is
considered to work politically either as a technique in its own right
(as in the case of sponsored events which provide opportunities for
access with policy e´lites) or by facilitating more traditional political
tactics (as happens, for example, where charitable donations are
considered to make access to policy e´lites more likely by creating
goodwill).[5,6,7,13] The documentary analysis identified four aims
(constituency building, access and relationship building, enhance-
ment of the company’s status as a source of credible information,
and framing effects/agenda setting) already outlined in the existing
literature,[13,14,15,16] and one new aim (subsidies/direct political
leverage) (Table 2). Our searches did not, however, identify
constituency fragmentation (see Table 2), which McDaniel and
Malone[15] found as a political aim underlying aspects of PM’s
philanthropy, although this may be an incidental effect of BAT’s
work around child labour[170] and with local communities (see,
for example, Appendix S3 and the section above). Donations in
these contexts indirectly weaken opposing political constituencies
by creating disincentives to collaborate with public health
advocates amongst recipient organisations.
Charitable donations recorded in recent BAT social reports
bear close similarities with these political aims. In particular, the
reports provide a rich store of contemporary examples of
donations that may help shape the tobacco control agenda. In
practice, the political aims of donations overlap and are likely to be
mutually reinforcing. Efforts to build constituencies, for example,
can produce both agenda setting and framing effects, whilst
changes in how social actors think about the industry and its
products (framing effects) are likely to facilitate other more
immediate political aims, such as access and constituency building.
Further, in the case of scholarships, donations seem to be partly
allocated on the basis of their capacity to build constituencies
which may facilitate future access to policy e´lites. By highlighting
these interconnections, the similarities between BAT and PM’s
political use of philanthropy, and the likely political aims
underlying contemporary BAT donations, the paper provides
strong evidence of the need for Parties to the FCTC to ban
tobacco industry philanthropy outright.
Contemporary Value of Political Philanthropy to Tobacco
Companies
Philanthropy represents a particularly valuable political tool for
contemporary transnational tobacco companies for three reasons.
The first concerns the on-going deterioration in the industry’s
insider status and decline in its reputation as a reliable provider of
policy relevant information.[95,171,172] Philanthropy has the
potential to offset the former and reverse the latter by creating a
less contentious basis for access which, over time, can facilitate
more routine interactions. This creates trust and strengthens
relationships between companies and officials, which is likely to
enhance firms’ status as credible purveyors of information and
augment their information advantage in policymak-
ing.[13,173,174,175,176]
The second concerns the role of charitable donations in building
constituencies, an effective means of political influence that
strengthens the effectiveness of other business political activities
and expands political conflicts in which business has an
interest.[17,18,19,28,177] Building constituencies through philan-
thropy can potentially circumvent the reluctance that many
economic and civil society actors are likely to have in openly
collaborating with the tobacco industry[113] and, by stimulating
third party advocacy and indirect lobbying, provides a potential
means of avoiding transparency rules recommended by the
Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC.[178]
Finally, philanthropy has the potential to neutralise on-going work
aimed at highlighting the net negative social and economic impacts
of the tobacco industry, which has been a key driver of efforts to
regulate the industry under the FCTC.[128,179,180,181,182]
Charitable donations are a form of symbolic communication which
have the potential to change perceptions through the associations
they create. By representing tobacco companies as important
vehicles of sustainable development, philanthropy has the potential
to stymie continuing efforts to model the net negative economic
effects of the tobacco industry in low and middle income countries
and reinforces manufacturers’ historic efforts to create different ways
of thinking about the industry and the risks it poses to the broader
public welfare.[183] Research in other policy domains suggests that
this may be particularly effective at facilitating BAT’s other political
activities as it asks social actors to focus on a different set of questions
about the industry, rather than directly challenging their existing
beliefs about its role in propagating tobacco related disease.[129]In
higher income countries the focus of BAT’s donations on training,
economic regeneration, poverty and social exclusion support the
company’s efforts to shape the tobacco control agenda in a broadly
similar way. By emphasising that it provides capital for programmes
which ameliorate the social effects of deindustrialisation, these types
of donation convey the continuing relevance of the company to the
long term social and economic success of richer nations.
Strengths, Limitations and Further Research
Despite the considerable epistemological advantages that
tobacco industry documents offer in analysing corporate deci-
sion-makers’ thinking on charitable contributions they rarely
depict the outcome of tobacco companies’ political activities.
Whilst further research may improve our understanding of the
political effects of tobacco industry philanthropy, these are likely to
be difficult to analyse given that they take place under low levels of
visibility and are likely to take effect over long periods of time. This
was recognised by BAT managers in the present study who noted
that actions undertaken to improve a firm’s image and reputation
were only likely to show results after several years of ‘‘continuous
and consistent efforts of many years.’’[184] A further methodo-
logical complication concerns the context dependent nature of
these effects. The ability of donations to influence social actors’
perception of a company are generally considered to be more
potent where stakeholders are not locked into a particular set of
beliefs about a company or where other measures of a company’s
social utility and underlying values are unclear, underdeveloped or
contradictory.[5] This may explain the importance BAT has
attached to using philanthropy in shaping perceptions in new
markets[56] and it is consistent with previous research indicating
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the importance BAT managers have attached to using CSR
practices to counter the spread of critical perceptions of the
industry from high to low and middle income countries.[95]
There are also a number of weaknesses in using social and
stakeholder reports as a basis for coding charitable gifts. First,
donations are usually only covered in stakeholder reports where
they are relevant to issues raised in dialogue with stakeholders.
Second, contributions are not necessarily discussed in sufficient
detail for coding. Third, the underlying motivation of charitable
donations or their political effects (such as whether donations have
created occasions for BAT managers to meet with policymakers) is
not discussed in the reports. News reports of donations being used
as financial inducements to political e´lites aimed at steering them
towards particular decisions suggests that in depth investigations
relying on a mix of methodologies (such as semi-structured
interviews, forensic accounting, and documentary work) may
address these weaknesses.
Policy implications
By confirming the findings of earlier work on PM,[13,14,15,16]
the present study underlines the importance of full implementation
of Article 13 of the FCTC which provides a unique opportunity to
outlaw socially suboptimal philanthropy (Appendix S1). Unlike
Article 5.3, Article 13 has the advantage of preventing political
impacts that occur even when news of gifts are not widely
publicised as in the case of donations to politicians’ favoured
charities. Civil society organisations’ dependence on industry
philanthropy potentially represent an important obstacle to its
prohibition. In Russia, for example, charities’ responses to reports
of a possible ban on tobacco industry donations were highly
critical, reflecting concerns that revenue streams to unfashionable
charities, such as those involved in caring for the elderly, might be
affected.[185,186] These criticisms are likely to be particularly
resonant in low and middle income countries where state social
provision is less developed. Such criticism underlines the
importance of clear communication and alliance building between
health professionals and civil society organisations, as well as the
strategic value of compensating affected charities, which could be
achieved through a hypothecated tax on tobacco companies.[187]
In addition to advocating legal reform, awareness raising of the
motivations underlying industry philanthropy is paramount.
Officials’ and the public’s estimation of the motives underlying
charitable donations are considered central to their capacity to
shape impressions.[5,11,13] Consequently, challenging this frame
is likely to reduce their political impact. The model developed in
the present study can facilitate this process by providing a
framework for identifying the potential political objectives of
donations that are not immediately apparent, such as agenda
setting and constituency building.
Table 2. Combined Political Aims underlying Tobacco Industry Philanthropy identified in the Present Study and
Existing Studies.
Underlying Aims Explanation of Effect Existing Literature Present Study
Constituency Building Donations used to facilitate closer relationships with recipient organisations
by generating trust and support and shape their organisational priorities.
Organisations are encouraged to lobby and advocate on behalf of the industry,
thereby expanding political conflicts around tobacco control.
Tesler and Malone, 2008;
McDaniel and Malone,
2009 and 2011
Yes
Constituency
Fragmentation[20]
Donations used to dissuade recipient organisations from lobbying against
companies’ interests. It has broadly the opposite effect to constituency building
in that it is designed to contain political conflicts by weakening constituencies
opposed to the tobacco industry.
McDaniel and Malone,
2009
Access and
Relationship building
Donations used to facilitate access both directly (by creating opportunities to
meet with policymakers by: securing invitations to charity events patronised
by officials and their spouses; inviting them to corporate sponsored charitable
events; targeting charities which overlap with government priorities; and
creating partnerships with politically connected recipient organisations) and
indirectly (by generating political capital and goodwill amongst policymakers;
strengthening relationships with policy e´lites; and fostering trust amongst
NGOs and opinion formers).
Tesler and Malone,
2008; McDaniel and
Malone, 2011.
Yes
Subsidies and Direct
Political Leverage
Political leverage achieved by creating a sense of indebtedness through
the provision of financial subsidies to specific political projects.
Yes
Enhancement of the
Company’s status
as a source of
credible information
Credibility as a source of information, data or evidence is linked to
positive corporate reputation. This effect is designed to revive, maintain
and, potentially in some cases, enhance the company’s underlying
structural information advantage in policymaking.
Tesler and Malone, 2008 Yes
Agenda and
framing effects
Donations to specific causes or aimed at building partnerships with
specific NGOs associate the company with economic and social
development with a view to shifting thinking on the policy importance
of regulating the market environment for tobacco.
Yes
Donations to charities involved in combatting non tobacco related risks to
health are made to reprioritise perceptions of the relative risks of smoking
on population level health.
Muggli, et al, 2008 Yes
Donations are channelled towards some NGOs in order to neutralise
the agenda setting potential of civil society organisations.
Yes
Donations are used to shape how the company is perceived (reputational
framing effects) which mitigate negative assessments of the firm and change
how policymakers and NGOs assess the aggregate social impacts of the firm.
Yes
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080864.t002
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A final question concerns whether this model can be applied to
companies in other industrial sectors which have negative impacts
on health, such as food and alcohol.[188,189,190,191,192,193]
Corporations’ political strategies are context dependent and vary
according to a wide range of institutional factors including levels of
regulatory risk and political
trust.[9,11,28,194,195,196,197,198,199] Political strategies used
by tobacco companies are, therefore, likely to be different from
those operating in other sectors of the economy. However, a
recent donation of US$10 million by the American Beverage
Association (the trade association of the soft drinks industry) to the
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia confirms the findings of other
research underlining the political value of charitable donations and
CSR across industrial sectors.[4,200,201] The donation followed
testimony to the City Council by doctors from the Children’s
Hospital of Philadelphia about the dangers of sugar-sweetened
drinks. At the time the City Council was considering whether to
introduce a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages sold in the
city,[202] suggesting very strongly that the donation was designed
to fragment and, therefore, weaken the political constituency in
favour of policy change. This and other examples[203] strongly
suggest that the model developed here can be used by public
health professionals to interpret the political motivations (and
potential effects) of charitable giving in the food, soft drinks, and
alcohol sectors.
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